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FREE WILL IN THE FRONTIERS OF FEDERALISM* 
] ohn R. Brownt 
I N an assembly dedicated, as this one is, to frontiers in law and legal education in celebration of the centennial of this great 
Law School and forecasting what is to be expected in the next 
one hundred years, the idea of states' rights-of the federal-state 
relationship-has seemed almost ironic. 
What Is a Frontier? 
A frontier is normally one of two things-either a boundary 
marking the last extreme of development or dominion, or, on the 
other hand, the point of departure-the jumping-off place into a 
new and untried field-the wild blue yonder and the great un-
known. But the notion that the federal-state relationship is a 
frontier seems not to fit either definition. The boundaries have 
not been limited and we are certainly not dealing with the great 
unknown. 
Federalism Is Timeless 
The fact is, as Justice Frankfurter has declared, "The problem 
... is as old as the Union and will persist as long as our society 
remains a constitutional federalism.''1 And Woodrow Wilson 
thought, "The question of the relations of the states and the fed-
eral government is the cardinal question of our constitutional 
system."2 
These ideas were echoed by President Eisenhower's message of 
March 30, 1953, and the congressional declaration in the act cre-
ating the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. It seems 
odd that after one hundred seventy-two years Congress found it 
necessary to declare, "It is necessary to study the proper role of the 
Federal Government in relation to the States and their political 
subdivisions . . . to the end that these relations may be clearly 
• The opening address presented at the program held in observance of the Centennial 
of The University of Michigan Law School, October 22, 23, 24, 1959.-Ed. 
t United States Circuit Judge, Fifth Circuit, Houston, Texas.-Ed. 
llrvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394 at 407 (1959). 
2.ANDERSON, THE NATION AND THE STATES, RIVALS OR PARTNERS? 3 (1955). 
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defined and the functions concerned may be allocated to their 
proper jurisdiction .... "3 
The Problem Won't Stay Away 
But notwithstanding such ambitious undertaking that "these 
relations . . . be clearly defined and the functions . . . allocated 
... " we shall always have this problem. Like Mordecai at the 
Gate, we shall always have to deal with it for the simple reason 
that there is no legal way to banish it-not, at least, so long as 
courts are open and citizens may petition their legislators. Nor 
can there be anything but the most superficial selectivity in 
choosing the time, or place, or circumstance, for decision.4 Voters-
pressure groups-compel legislative bodies to listen and perhaps 
enact, and litigants with an actual case and controversy compel 
courts to hear and adjudicate though the cause has an unsavory 
flavor or the timing is inopportune.5 The stress on this relation-
ship is seldom a direct contest, legislative or judicial, between the 
two levels of government. Nearly always is the dispute between 
citizens, on the one hand, and one of the two governments on the 
other.6 But being the many-sided paradox that it is, it is this un-
s 67 Stat. 145, §1, 5 U.S.C. (1958) §§138a-138j note, approved July 10, 1953. This 
resulted in the appointment of the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations whose 
report to the President for transmittal to Congress was published in 1955. In addition to 
the commission report comprising Part I, a general treatment and conclusions, and Part II 
on specific recommendations in functional responsibilities of various specific activities, 
there was also published as an appendix fifteen Study Committee Reports covering in 
detail such problems as federal aid to agriculture, highways, education, public health, 
national resources, airports, urban redevelopment and impact of federal grants-in-aid. 
This culmination of the persistent tireless efforts of individuals and agencies is well traced 
in the annotated chronology, INTER-GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 
(RM-321), published by the Council of State Governments, especially pages 63-108 (1958). 
4 "[W]hat the Government never can do, whatever techniques of legislation it em-
ploys, is to change the way in which the problems keep coming to it, emerging at the level 
of private activity with the gloss of private adjustments and maladjustments already put 
upon them." Hart, "The Relations between State and Federal Law," 54 CoL. L. REv. 489 
(1954), in MACMAHON, FEDERALISM MATURE AND EMERGENT 177 (1955), compiling papers 
presented at the Conference on Federalism, January 1954, Columbia University. 
5 The famous "sick chicken" [Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)] 
is a notable example. See SWISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 2d ed., 931 
(1954). On the other hand, there are highly respected sources that think that "timing" is 
a legally relevant and important factor in the determination of controversial constitutional 
issues. This was a major theme of Dean Ray Forrester, Tulane University Law School, in 
a paper presented to the institute on constitutional law held by the Houston Bar Associa-
tion in April 1959, the proceedings of which were published in 4 So. TEX. L.J. 107 (1959). 
See Forrester, "The Supreme Court and the Rule of Law," 4 So. TEX. L.J. 107 at 114 
(1959), and the question and answer discussion at pages 120-128 concerning the propriety 
of "timing" as a factor. 
6 Of course, state legislatures may, and often, do, memorialize (or even "interpose") 
Congress if sufficiently provoked, and the respective governments frequently enter private 
litigation as intervenor or as amicus, but responsible control is elsewhere. 
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amenability to authoritative direction that assures continued vi-
tality to federalism. 
Federalism Insoluble 
Not only does its emergence from private affairs assure that the 
problem will be with us-the only uncertainty being where or 
when will it strike-the fact is that by its very nature it must be 
with us because it is insoluble. This leads me to confess that in 
the many hours I have spent in the education of this judge on the 
meaning of federalism, I have been more and more impressed 
with its kinship to theology. I hope you will not treat it as an un-
due trespass on this nonsectarian gathering for me to say, in 
illustration, that it resembles in many ways controversial areas of 
my Calvinistic faith as we have, for example, undertaken to recon-
cile the contradictions of Free Will and Predestination. But the 
fact is that the very nature of federalism defies categorical delinea-
tion. Pointing up the inherent contradictions, MacMahon applies 
Dicey's classic statement that federalism "requires for its formation 
two conditions." On the other hand, there must be "a body of 
countries . . . so closely connected by locality, by history, by race, 
or the like, as to be capable of bearing, in the eyes of their inhabi-
tants, an impress of common nationality." On the other hand, 
there must exist "a very peculiar state of sentiment among the in-
habitants of the countries, which it is proposed to unite. They must 
desire union, and must not desire unity."7 
Even the classic outlines of that great expounder, Chief Justice 
Marshall, carry their own seeds of uncertainty. He declared, 
"That the United States form, for many and for most important 
purposes, a single nation," and the states as "constituent parts of 
the United States ... are members of one great empire-for 
some purposes sovereign, for some purposes subordinate;"8 and 
the "Powers of sovereignty are divided between the government 
of the Union, and those of the States. They are each sovereign, 
with respect to the objects committed to it, and neither sovereign 
with respect to the objects committed to the other."9 
It is no modern cynical rejection of these profound statements 
which had decisive significance in the constitutional history of 
our nation to suggest that the concept of sovereignty was unavoid-
ably given an elasticity which political science had theretofore not 
7 MACMAHON, FEDERALISM MATURE AND EMERGENT 6 (1955). 
s Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. (19 U.S.) 264 at 413-414 (1821). 
o McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 316 at 410 (1819). 
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known. Especially is that so if we add to the two governments, as 
such, the ultimate sovereignty of the people. Either the term 
"sovereign" is elastic10-and hence needs continuous definition; 
or these flowery statements were palpable demagoguery. 
Contradictions in Federalism 
The conceptual uncertainties of this unique political complex 
find tangible expression in limitless ways. For example, as I 
elucidate further, it was the complete independence of the states 
under the Confederation and the lack of power in the central 
government to enforce its proper demands upon the constituent 
states that was once the chief weakness of that structure and, more 
important, a main precipitant for the Constitutional Convention. 
There seems to have been unanimous agreement among the dele-
gates that the country was facing political life or death. These 
sentiments and the necessity for strong therapy were reflected 
in the resolution proposed which gave the National Legislature 
power "to call forth the force of the Union against any member 
. . . failing to fulfill its duty under the Articles thereof. "11 
Madison first thought well of this, but on more reflection on the 
use of force, the more he doubted the practicability, the justice, 
and the efficacy of it when applied to people collectively and not 
individually. Efforts to revive this mechanism were soundly de-
nounced. Its wisdom is demonstrated in our own historical perspec-
tive, and perhaps more vividly in the spectacular failure of South 
American countries-whose governmental structure is largely pat-
terned on ours-to capture the real spirit of freedom through fed-
eralism. There subjugation of the constituent states by military 
forces of the central government has not only imperiled the quali-
fied sovereignty of the parts; it has, within the central govern-
ment, made it a question of who has the effective control of the 
military.12 
Our own experience-some of it tragic and contemporary-
attests that when the contest is between two states, or between a 
10 As much was recognized by the letter of transmittal from the Convention to the 
Congress of the Confederation. "It is obviously impracticable in the Federal Government 
of these States, to secure all rights of independent sovereignty to each, and yet provide for 
the interest and safety of all. Individuals entering into society must give up a share of 
liberty to preserve the rest." WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 688 (1947). 
11 WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CoNSTITUTION 171 (1947). 
12This is well traced by Arthur N. Holcombe in the chapter on "The Coercion of 
States in a Federal System," in MACMAHON, FEDERALISM MATURE AND EMERGENT 137 (1955). 
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state and the national government, and the controversy is trans-
lated into the demand for positive-not negative-action, ordinary 
judicial processes lack their usual coercive effect13 and the use of 
sheer force is an unsatisfactory substitute for a disciplined submis-
sion to law.14 But the paradox remains: the one must yield to the 
other, but must not be forced to yield against its real will. 
Federalism Bears Prenatal Marks 
Apparent contradictions do not end in the conceptual defini-
tions. For our Constitution, and hence the governmental structure 
of federalism, is a product of dual and competing demands. Its 
continued vitality depends upon its capacity to respond to like 
demands emerging in different ways and on different subjects, 
but still a reflex of the yearning for strength in unity and diverse 
expression in localized independence. The clash existed at the 
moment of birth. Indeed, the impact of these prenatal forces was 
vivid on this political structure which Washington called "a child 
of fortune, to be fostered by some and buffeted by others. "115 
While the demand for protection of interests, which we vaguely 
describe as "states' rights," was persistent and effective and resulted 
in many of the great compromises of the Convention, the current 
excitement in the name of states' rights frequently lacks historical 
balance. I would hasten to add that in making that statement, I 
do not disparage those, or their motives, either now or at other 
times, who are so vocal.16 
But I think it fair criticism to suggest that much of the con-
temporary protest gives the impression that states' rights as the so-
called law of the land was the principal concern of the Constitu-
13 See, for example, Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565 (1918), and the prior 
appearances of this case, 206 U.S. 290 (1907); 209 U.S. 514 (1908); 220 U.S. I (1911); 222 
U.S. 17 (1911); 231 U.S. 89 (1913); 234 U.S. 117 (1914); 238 U.S. 202 (1915); 241 U.S. 531 
(1916), in the nearly sixty-year effort to enforce on West Virginia a portion of the public 
debts assumed by West Virginia at the time it was carved out of Virginia as a new state. 
14 This is generally exemplified by the action of Governor Almond of Virginia once 
the series of unsuccessful appeals through the federal courts authoritatively nullified the 
structure of Virginia's massive resistance legislation. 
15Washington's letter to Lafayette, Sept. 18, 1787, WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CON-
STITUTION 725 (1947). 
16 Critics of those now invoking states' rights may be open to like criticism of selfish 
motive. For example, supremacy of the federal government under the commerce clause 
was for long a tool of laissez-faire, not to assure federal regulation, but to prohibit that by 
the states. The consequence was, at times, almost to force the states to find an enumerated 
power (the police power) to sustain local legislation. See SWISHER, AMERICAN CoNsrrru-
TIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 2d ed., 188-207 (1954). Much the same is true of those attacking 
state acts regulating business under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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tional Convention. The historical truth is that the Convention 
was assembled and the writing of the Constitution undertaken not 
to perpetuate the states as they then existed. The Convention did, 
of course, deal with the imperative need for (1) unity for survival, 
but equally important was the demand for (2) effective curbs on 
the states vis-a-vis their own inhabitant citizens and to prevent 
discriminations and obstacles to trade and commerce among the 
states. The first factor of necessity is well known. Washington, 
then respected by all, described the shaky condition of the Con-
federation. "In a word, it is at an end; and, unless a remedy is soon 
applied, anarchy and confusion will inevitably ensue."17 To him 
the first requirement to "the existence of the United States, as an 
independent power" was "an indissoluble union of the States under 
one Federal head."18 
But no less important was the second factor. Indeed, inclusion 
of new express prohibitions upon the powers of the states was-
a noted author states-a response "in favor of honesty and morality" 
by putting "an end to statutes enacting laws for special individuals, 
setting aside Court judgments, repealing vested rights, altering 
corporate charters, staying the bringing or prosecution of suits, 
preventing foreclosure of mortgages, altering the terms of con-
tracts, and allowing tender in payment of debts of something 
other than that contracted for."19 
And the story of the need for national control of interstate 
and foreign commerce is a familiar one which is, and necessarily 
will be, never finished.20 
Of course, this is not the whole picture.21 It serves our present 
purpose of illustrating the intense competition between · forces 
which would, at one and the same time, produce a nation and a 
union of separate independent states having dominion over all 
things internal. 
17Washington's letter to Jefferson, May 30, 1787, WARREN, THE MAKING OF TIIE CoN-
STITUTION 155 (1947). . 
18 General Washington's letter to the governors of the states, June 8, 1783, id. at 13. 
19 Id. at 552. The author earlier stated: "[O]ne of the causes of the calling of the 
Convention was the unjust and harmful legislation which had been indulged in by the State 
Legislatures." Id. at 548. 
20 An excellent review is that of Professor Allison Dunham, "Congress, The States 
and Commerce,'' 8 UNIV. CHI. L. SCHOOL RECORD 54 (Special Supp. 1958). This is one of 
seven monographs prepared for use of the Committee on Federal-State Relationships as 
Affected by Judicial Decisions of the Conference of Chief Justices which subsequently 
adopted the Brune report. 
21 These manifold interlocking forces are well summarized by SWISHER, AMERICAN 
CoNSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 2d ed., 26 (1954). 
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Federalism a Frontier of Uncertainty 
So you can see from this very extensive prologue that states' 
rights or federal-state relationships hardly satisfy either definition 
of a frontier. There is and can be no fixed boundary and one 
could hardly say that something that has been with us for one 
hundred seventy-two years is an advanced region of unexplored 
thought. But having demonstrated this to talk myself off this 
program, I fear it has done just the reverse. It has demonstrated, 
I think, that in a very real sense this is a frontier. For having had 
the problem with us so long and being by nature an insoluble one, 
we must recognize that the future holds uncertainty. 
But uncertainty does not daunt me. In today's tensions we 
would be demanding a luxury out of step with the times if we 
were either to insist on-or regret the absence of-certainty in the 
field of constitutional government. Indeed, I would think that 
certainty-almost universal certainty in the era of 1890-1920 that 
experimental state legislation would be annulled by Supreme 
Court action-may have been one of the principal causes for the 
revolutionary changes of the New Deal period. That certainty 
was also one which-too many are too prone to forget too soon-
came from the use of the same broad guaranties of the Federal 
Constitution to strike down state action-in short, to deny states' 
rights. 
Uncertainty From Explosive Growth 
This uncertainty will comprehend many areas. One will be the 
question of who, in actual practice, will be the ultimate significant 
determiner-the judiciary, the executive, or the legislative. Others 
will be the likely trends in specific areas, such as criminal law. 
Others may arise in areas of new technological development of 
which atomic energy may now be regarded as almost ancient as 
the nations of the world probe into outer space. All of these will 
be complicated by an exploding population which will run our 
population from 172 million in 1958 to the staggering total of 
272 million in 1980-just twenty years away.22 And cutting across 
all others in another facet of our mushrooming population and 
economy-the modern metropolitan area. Defined by the Census 
Bureau as a complex community of 50,000 population or more 
22 BUREAU OF THE CENsus, U.S. DEPT. OF CO!',IMERCE, STATISTICAL .ABSTRAcr OF THE UNITED 
STATFS 1, 6 (1958). 
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with an urban fringe, there were in 1955 over I 70 such areas. 
Of them, 23 extend across and 28 others up to a state line. Forty-
three million persons-one out of every four-live in metropolitan 
areas that are now, or may soon become, interstate.23 Yearn as 
we will for the days of old, the 160 miles which General Wash-
ington travelled back on departure from Philadelphia to his be-
loved Mount Vernon is now so short that a modem jet could not 
be efficiently employed. And in this small area over six and one-
half million people make up the metropolitan areas of Phila-
delphia, Wilmington, Baltimore and Washington. And all of this 
is accompanied by ceaseless movement in the nation's 66 million 
motor vehicles.24 
If, in the midst of a nationwide steel strike which cripples the 
economy of the industrial state of Michigan, we could declare in 
the old absolutisms that there was no "possible legal or logical 
connection ... between an employe's membership in a labor 
organization and the carrying on of interstate commerce,"25 I 
would have to acknowledge that the Constitution takes no heed of 
23 Report of the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 50-51 (1955). See also 
STATISTICAL ABsrRAcr OF THE UNITED STATES, note 22 supra, Table 11 at p. 15, and Table 
38 at p. 39. Our restless undulating mobility is shown by the fact that in the year 1956-
1957 over five million persons moved from one state to another. 
24 Id. at 557, Table 709. This brings sharply to mind the humorous wisdom of Lord 
Simonds, Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain, in his address to the American Bar Asso· 
ciation [39 A.B.A.J. 1060 at 1116 (1953)] concerning English welfare legislation. "Such 
legislation, which dates back now for many decades, has become an essential feature of 
the civilization that we know. It has its dangers in the proliferation of regulations and 
of officials to enforce them and of tribunals to determine their application, and there are 
many who sigh for more Arcadian simplicity of life. But in Arcadia, the sound of the 
internal combustion engine had not silenced the pipes of Pan; it is vain to seek pastoral 
ease in the hearts of great industrial cities." 
25 Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 at 178 (1908). The statement is even more 
startling since the legislation was the outgrowth of the bloody pullman strike. SWISHER, 
AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 2d ed., 520 et seq. (1954). 
In retrospect, the economic legalisms of Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 at 309 
(1936), uttered in 1936 in the depths of a nationwide depression, are perhaps even more 
surprising. "Such effect as [labor controversies] may have upon commerce, however 
extensive it may be, is secondary and indirect. An increase in the greatness of the effect 
adds to its importance. It does not alter its character." 
When the problem is excised from the context of controversy over the Supreme Court 
or federal encroachment and approached as a matter of economics, even the most con-
servative sources consistently critical of federal encroachment and judicial legislation by 
the Supreme Court recognize the devastating economic impact of strikes over labor con-
tracts. See, e.g., HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Sept. 26, 1959, editorial, "Steel Strike Can't Continue 
Without Disastrous Effects": "From here on the effects of the 74-day-old steel strike will 
snowball. The past week brought the closing of the first automobile components plant as 
a result of lack of steel. From now on, unless the mills reopen soon, plants large and 
small will be closing throughout the country. Unemployment will rise sharply. Business 
in all lines will be adversely affected." 
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population26 as such. And of automobiles, of course, it knew naught. 
But my departure is not over the declaration of legal principles. 
Infirmity comes from the misinterpretation of economic factors 
and those which-until a few years ago-we could safely describe as 
sociological. The aggregation of these large masses in compressed 
areas foretells the stress upon interstate commerce for the mere 
supply of daily needs of food and fuel, and the undulating mobility 
across lines, artificial, unseen, and incapable of containing the 
constant pressure of social and economic forces.27 
Who Will Draw the Line? 
In all of these uncertainties I think the thing most certain is the 
agency which will be the principal ultimate determinant in out-
lining state and federal relations. Based upon the development of 
the last forty years, it is my belief that Congress-in the last an-
alysis-will bear the principal responsibility and perform the most 
important role in this process. 
I arrive at this prediction through the interplay of several 
factors. One, of course, is the commerce clause expanded under 
the influence of the New Deal era decisions.28 Another factor, of 
course, is the Court's marked change in its attitude toward state 
legislation.29 But in my approach I prefer to minimize these 
factors. Each was an overturning of the past so that many-
especially at the bar-sincerely think that the very Ark of the 
26 Excepted, of course, is apportionment for the House of Representatives and a direct 
tax. 
27 American history, so far as I know, deals with no isolated panics of consequence; 
they were either nationwide or affected substantial sections of the country. 
28 The National Labor Relations Act upheld in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); Railway Labor Act upheld in Virginia R. Co. v. System Federa-
tion No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937); the amended Agricultural Act upheld in Mulford v. 
Smith, 307 U.S. 38 (1939); Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. I (1939). See Wickard v. Filburn, 
317 U.S. Ill (1942), and the highly critical comments of it in White, "The Supreme Court's 
Avenues of Escape from the Constitution," 4 So. Troe:. L.J. 129 at 136-137 (1959), one of 
a series of papers presented at the institute on constitutional law by the Houston Bar 
Association in April 1959. The Fair Labor Standards Act upheld in United States v. 
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126 (1941). 
29 Spectacular cases in the same field of labor relations were West Coast Hotel Co. v. 
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), overruling Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 
587 (1936), and Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923). 
Never in our history have the states been accorded a greater opportunity for legislative 
experimentation. See Rostow, "The Court and Its Critics," 4 So. Troe:. L.J. 160 at 172-173 
(1959), one of five papers presented at the two-day institute on constitutional law held by 
the Houston Bar Association in April 1959. See KAUPER, FRONTIERS OF CoNSTlTUTIONAL 
LIBERTY 34-38 (1956), the seventh series of the Thomas M. Cooley Lectures delivered at the 
University of Michigan. 
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Covenant was carried away by the Philistines when Hammer v. 
Dagenhart was rejected.30 
The Power of the Purse 
In my analysis I avoid most of these allergical implications by a 
third route. For all practical purposes, I think now the most effec-
tive power of federal intervention with constitutional implica-
tions is the power of the purse. 
While the triple-A processing tax went down in United States 
v. Butler}1 that case, much like Marbury v. Madison, was in 
some aspects a mighty build-up for an awful letdown. For Justice 
Roberts at great length expounds, and the Court adopts, the 
Story concept in opposition to that advanced by Madison to hold 
that the power to lay and collect taxes was to collect and appro-
priate taxes for the general welfare and not merely as an incident 
to the enumerated powers. The tax and appropriation, of course, 
must bear some reasonable relationship to a national objective, 
but the burden would be heavy to upset the discretion of Congress 
in the ascertainment of that end. And so long as some professional 
skill is exercised in the avoidance of the pitfalls of Butler, there 
is really no effective method of judicial review, and hence no 
prospect of judicial disapproval. Grants-in-aid and tax rebates, 
credits or refunds, cannot effectively be challenged by the states 
whose internal affairs are affected in a practical way by the fed-
eral stimulus to policy, nor by individual taxpayers whose burden 
is that only of taxpayers generally.32 
30 247 U.S. 251 (1918) and see the sequel, Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 
(1922). 
31297 U.S. I (1936). 
32 Massachusetts v. Melon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), rejecting the attack on the constitu-
tionality of federal grants-in-aid to Massachusetts for maternity benefits. See SWISHER, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 2d ed., 837 (1954); Furman, "The Impact of 
Federal Subsidies on State Functions,'' 43 A.B.A.J. 1101 at 1145, n. 73 (1957), prize-winning 
paper in the 1957 Ross Essay Contest. White, "The Supreme Court's Avenues of Escape 
from the Constitution,'' 4 So. TEX. L.J. 129 at 130-131 (1959), given as a part of the two-
day institute on constitutional law held by the Houston Bar Association in April 1959; 
Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12 (1927), sustained 80% federal estate tax credit which had 
the effect of closing down state estate tax oasis and thereby achieve an assumed federal 
policy of relative uniformity of state taxation of estates. Strong, "Cooperative Federalism," 
23 IowA L. REv. 459 (1938), thought this constituted almost outright dictation of policy 
by Congress. Somewhat on the strength of these, the Social Security Act (Titles II and VIII) 
was upheld in Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937), and (Titles III and IX) in Stewart 
Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937). Operating in parallel was the Court's more 
tolerant view of state experimentation in upholding state unemployment compensation 
acts of Alabama and New York. Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 
(1937); Chamberlain v. Andrews, 299 U.S. 515 (1936). Some, including the Commission 
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Occasionally there may be an activity whose adequate na-
tional control ·will require punitive-regulatory sanctions of a type 
beyond the permissible direct use of taxes, such as those used to 
stamp out narcotics, oleomargarine, hoodlums' weapons, local tin-
horn gamblers and petty grafters.33 If so, reliance on enumerated 
powers, the most likely being commerce, may be necessary. The 
Court will then resume its role of marking the line. 
But except for these the federal government-especially in areas 
of great controversy-will have virtually a hand free of judicial 
restraint in formulating, in effectuating, in encouraging, in stimu-
lating a federal policy through state action financed through fed-
eral grants-in-aid34 or tax credits. 
Areas of General Welfare 
Probably one of the most controversial areas of proposed fed-
eral intervention is that of aid to education on a widespread scale. 
Few would assert the presence of any express enumerated power 
to justify any such comprehensive program. And yet none could 
deny the national interest and the immediacy of the general wel-
fare of the United States in the adequate education of its children, 
and hence its citizens. Historically the federal government has 
aided education from an early day.35 And so long as regulations 
on Intergovernmental Relations, consider that "Coming full circle after 125 years by the 
route of implied powers, the Supreme Court now gives to the list of powers delegated to 
Congress in Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution approximately the same broad sweep 
of meaning conveyed by the Virginia Plan • • .'' (Report of the Commission on Inter-
governmental Relations 28-29 (1955)] which initially proposed that the national govern-
ment have "power to legislate in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent 
or in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of indi-
vidual legislation.'' An interim resolution subsequently passed by the Convention was 
even closer. It authorized Congress to "legislate in all cases for the general interests of 
the Union, and also in those to which the States are separately incompetent, or in which 
the harmony of the United States may be interrupted .... " WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE 
CoNSTlTUTION 315 (1947). 
33 Tax on narcotics: The United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919) (license tax on 
dealers); Alston v. United States, 274 U.S. 289 (1927) (tax on narcotics). Tax on oleo-
margarine: McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904). The Wagering Stamp Tax Act, 
now 26 U.S.C. (1958) §§4411-4414, upheld in the United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 
(1953). The dissent points up some limitations. Tax on firearms upheld in Sonzinsky v. 
United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937). See the annotation, Validity of Federal Tax as Affected 
by Restrictive Suppressive or Other Ulterior Purpose, 97 L.Ed. 767 (1953). 
34As Anderson points out in THE NATION AND THE STATES, RlvALS OR PARTNERS? 177 
(1955), financial grants-in-aid are not new. Four programs were begun before 1900, the 
earliest in 1879; none from 1901 to 1910; eight from 1911 to 1920; one from 1921 to 1930. 
Since then, of course, the expansion has been spectacular-15 from 1931 to 1940, 23 from 
1941 to 1950 and 1 in 1951. 
35 This included the Morrill Land Grant Acts for state agriculture and mechanical 
schools in 1862, the 1887 Hatch Agricultural Experiment Station Act, the grant to Ohio 
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on the disbursing of federal funds did not trespass the vague out-
lines of the Butler case, the exertion of that control would not 
subject the state to impermissible coercion or arrogate to the fed-
eral government a right beyond its powers. 
Housing, urban resettlement, slum clearance, mortgage in-
surance, public health, and related activities are less controversial 
in the public mind but essentially similar to education.36 
Tax Grants-Persuasive or Coercive? 
This power through taxation (credit and grant) is spectacular. 
We have witnessed its use bring about almost uniform state policies 
overnight. To avoid a penalty on its industrial taxpayers and to 
obtain for them the 90 percent credit against the federal employ-
ment security tax, every state fell in line.37 Here there was no 
prohibition by the federal government, no extra payment by the 
employer beyond that which he would have to pay if his state had 
a suitable unemployment compensation act, and no coercive pen-
alties. Yet through this exertion of the taxing power and simul-
taneous use of the tax credit, the federal government was able to 
achieve what its Congress then thought was a desirable nation-
wide policy for state-local administration. 
Congress an Experienced Line Drawer 
But to frankly recognize this power in Congress is not neces-
sarily to signal the end of the world. The judiciary is not the sole 
of school lands on its admission in 1803, the Smith-Hughes Vocational Education Act of 
1917, and others. See BOWIE AND FRIEDRICH, STUDIES IN FEDERALISM 485-496 (1954); Gaus, 
"Agricultural Policy and Administration in the American Federal System," in MAcMAHoN, 
FEDERALISM MATURE AND EMERGENT 283 et seq. (1955). 
36 Vocational rehabilitation is a sharp illustration. In 1955 the present backlog of 
persons in need of vocational rehabilitation was estimated to be 2,000,000. Without fixing 
responsibility for their rehabilitation as between state, local or federal government, it is 
unthinking to assert that the federal government facing its admitted responsibility for 
preservation of the nation in world affairs is not concerned with the welfare of these 
people. By changes in the program, the number rehabilitated annually has increased from 
9,000 in 1943 to 52,000, and under the 1954 amendments, it is estimated that the number 
will be 200,000. The states will contribute approximately 40% of the cost. Report of the 
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 256 (1955). 
37 The impact of the Federal Social Security Act on state legislation is traced in 
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 538 at 587-588 (1937). In 1931 Wisconsin stood 
alone. In 1935 four states passed unemployment compensation laws on the eve of the 
adoption of the Social Security Act. "In 1936 twenty-eight other states fell in line, and 
eight more the present [1937] year." The opinion points out that it was not the lack of 
political power which had previously resulted in nonaction by the states. The deterrent 
was the fear of economic disadvantage in competition with other states not imposing that 
burden on industry. 
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guardian of the Constitution.88 Congress has a compelling obli-
gation to give heed to it, and constitutional historians uniformly 
consider that, in point of bulk and volume, Congress has stopped 
more unconstitutional legislation than courts could have possibly 
annulled. 
More than that, Congress has had long experience in the con-
stitutional drawing of lines. The Supreme Court for over a cen-
tury has recognized that under the commerce clause, for example, 
the Keys of the Kingdom are in the hands of Congress. For in the 
wake of Cooley v. The Board of Port Wardens,89 where nonaction 
by Congress became the subject of judicial evaluation, it was soon 
made clear that Congress had but to speak either in determining 
whether the subject was of a nature requiring national uniformity 
or in relinquishing all or portions of the field to the states even if 
that were so.40 
We have seen spectacular exertions of this ultimate congres-
sional determination in the area of commerce. Ironically, the neces-
sity of this may again have been the outgrowth of the certainty 
of pre-existing judicial attitude.41 This led Congress, then, by 
careful draftsmanship of new legislation to make broad claims. 
Once the legislation was upheld, the presence of such sweeping 
ss The Executive has frequently recognized this duty. See, for example, President 
Johnson's veto of the first Civil Rights Act because the provisions of the act "interfere with 
the municipal legislation of the states, with the relations existing exclusively between a 
state and its citizens ••• - an absorption and assumption of power by the general gov-
ernment which, if acquiesced in, must sap and destroy our federative system of limited 
powers and break down the barriers which preserve the rights of the states ..•. " SWISHER, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 2d ed., 316 (1954). And see that of President 
Franklin Pierce, May 3, 1854, vetoing a grant of public lands for the benefit of indigent, 
insane persons, quoted at length in the dissent of Justice McReynolds, Steward Machine 
Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 at 600-609 (1937). 
3912 How. (53 U.S.) 299 (1851). 
40 BOWIE AND FRIEDRICH, STUDIES IN FEDERALISM 354 (1954). Strong, "Cooperative 
Federalism," 23 IowA L. REv. 459 (1938), especially on congressional divestiture of the 
interstate character of the goods (liquor) under the Webb-Kenyon Act, upheld in Clark 
Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland R. Co., 242 U.S. 311 (1917); and prison-made goods, 
see Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U.S. 431 (1936); Kentucky Whip &: Collar Co. v. Illinois Central 
R. Co., 299 U.S. 334 (1937). Ribble, "National and State Cooperation Under the Com-
merce Clause," 37 CoL. L. REv. 43 at 50 (1937). Dunham, "Congress, The States and 
Commerce," 8 UNIV. Cm. LAw SCHOOL REcoRD 54 (Special Supp. 1958). 
41 The labor decisions on minimum wages and hours of work presented an earlier 
no-man's land. See Bowm AND FRIEDRICH, STUDIES IN FEDERALISM 587 (1954). The action 
of the Supreme Court "meant that there could in fact be no minimum wage legislation 
at all, since the commerce clause could not cover the federal power, and the contract clause 
limited the power of the States." 
See also Kurland, "The Supreme Court and the Attrition of State Power," 10 STAN. L. 
REv. 274 at 284 (1958). Ribble, "National and State Cooperation under the Commerce 
Clause," 37 CoL. L. REv. 43 at 44-45 (1937). 
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claims led to tangible assertion of federal control in areas best left 
to the states. Thus, in labor-management relations, the Taft-
Hartley Act undertook to permit the limited cession of power over 
some activities to the states. The National Labor Relations Board 
by administrative dollar standards reduced the areas in which 
it would assert its conceded power. The result was that there 
were areas within the power of the Board, but over which the 
Board would not act. Were the states free to? We all know the 
answer. By a series of decisions, the Court, broadly speaking, 
held that the federal act pre-empted the field.42 And it was this 
no-man's land where the federal board would not, and the states 
could not, act that became one of the principal matters dealt with 
in the very recent amendments to the Taft-Hartley Act. Thus 
did Congress respond to the Court's earnest plea that it draw the 
line.43 Even more recently we have seen Congress act in the oppo-
site direction. After the Court in February of 1959 upheld a 
state net income tax on the solely interstate operations of a foreign 
corporation,44 Congress responded quickly by an act which ex-
pressly excludes from the power of state taxation many of the ac-
42 The principal cases most discussed are Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 
U.S. 1 (1957); Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20 (1957); San 
Diego Bldg. Trades v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26 (1957); Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 
U.S. 468 (1955); Gamer v. Teamsters, C. &: H. Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953); NLRB v. Fain-
blatt, 306 U.S. 601 (1939). 
See also Knee, "Federal Supremacy in Labor Management Relations,'' 27 FoRD. L. 
REv. 373 (1958); Van de Water and Petrowitz, "Federal-State Jurisdiction and the Con-
stitutional Framework in Industrial Relations,'' 31 So. CAL. L. REv. 111 (1958). 
The whole subject is extensively dealt with by Professor Bernard Meltzer, University 
of Chicago Law School, in "The Supreme Court, Congress and State Jurisdiction Over 
Labor Relations," 8 UNIV. CHx. LAw SCHOOL RECORD, No. I (Special Supp. 1958), one of the 
monographs prepared for and used by the Committee on Federal-State Relationships of the 
Conference of Chief Justices leading to the adoption of its celebrated report in August 1958. 
43 This is well developed by Professor Cox in "Federalism in the Law of Labor Rela-
tions," 67 HARV. L. REv. 1297 (1954). He points out that Congress with the ultimate 
power to draw the line frequently does not. Sometimes competing pressures are too great, 
in others it is too complicated with the resulting situation of seeming despair, and some-
times out of a recognition, accidental or conscious, that the court in its slow and plodding 
case by case system is best able to weigh and work out carefully the subtle implications of 
federalism. And see Rostow, "The Court and Its Critics," 4 So. TEX. L.J. 160 at 171 (1959), 
one of the papers of the two-day institute on constitutional law held by the Houston Bar 
Association, April 1959. 
44 Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959). This 
was one of several significant cases involving the power of a state to tax the subjects of 
interstate or foreign commerce: Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434 
(1959); Youngstown Sheet &: Tube Co. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 534 (1959); Allied Stores v. 
Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959); E. T. &: W. N. C. Trans. Co. v. Currie, 359 U.S. 28 (1959). 
S. Rep. 453, 86th Cong., 1st sess. (1959), submitted by the Senate Select Committee 
on Small Business, discusses problems raised by these decisions. 
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tivities held by the Court to be within the permissive constitutional 
reach of the states.45 
We recall other experiences of Congress in drawing the con-
stitutional line. This includes the McCarran Act46 which over-
turned the effect of a recent decision holding that the insurance 
business was interstate despite decades of contrary judicial hold-
ings.47 Likewise, Congress has relinquished much of federal im-
munity to state and local taxation of property of the federal gov-
ernment or its instrumentalities.48 
Congress Experienced in Refusing To Act 
Oddly enough, nonaction by Congress, better than affirmative 
action, reflects an awareness by Congress of the awesome powers 
it holds and the necessity for responsible action. 
For example, with the acknowledged power to obliterate alto-
gether the source for much of the criticism that federal encroach-
ment results from unsound decisions by the Supreme Court, the 
Congress has resisted all demands to reduce the appellate jurisdic-
tion of the Court. It has also resisted thus far all efforts for an 
automatic anti-federal-preemption statute although one nearly 
squeaked by. And in the irritating field of review of state criminal 
convictions,49 Congress with a power to withdraw habeas corpus 
jurisdiction of such cases entirely from federal courts has been slow 
and cautious despite a universal recognition that some change is 
45 73 Stat. 555 (1959), 15 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1959) §381. 
46 59 Stat. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C. (1958) §1011. 
47 Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946), upheld the McCarran Act's 
overruling the effect of United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U.S. 533 
(1944). See Handler, "Patterns of Trade Regulation in a Federal System," in MACMAHON, 
FEDERALISM MATURE AND EMERGENT 352 (1955). 
48 Of course, Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939), considerably 
restricted the area, but much remains. The problem of loss of tax revenues to local 
governments from widespread government ownership of property, the mechanisms for 
alleviating the burden, and the separation of types of property and activities as fields to 
be reserved for federal, or state, or local taxation to the exclusion of the others has been 
one of the major concerns of those participating in organized treatment of federal-state 
relationship. See, e.g., Joint Conference on Federal-State Tax Relations established 1947, 
House Subcommittee on Tax Coordination established October 1951, and others summarized 
in the annotated chronology INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (RM-
321), published by the Council of State Governments (1958). 
Congress has frequently waived immunity. Freund, "Umpiring the Federal System,'' 
54 CoL. L. REv. 561 at 562 (1954). 
49 See the exhaustive review by Professor Allen, "The Supreme Court, Federalism, and 
State Systems of Criminal Justice," 8 UNIV. CHI. I.Aw SCHOOL REcoRD 3 (Special Supp. 
1958), one of a series of monographs prepared for the Conference of Chief Justices. 
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needed.1'0 We are also acutely conscious that Congress has not 
responded to the bitter criticism of the Court by disavowing the 
doctrine of preemption in the allergical fields of state subversive 
acts and right-to-work bills.51 
Congress is not, therefore, setting sail on an uncharted sea. 
It has a century or more of discipline in the use of this vast and 
awesome and important power. 
Policy Guides for Congressional Line Drawing 
This digression to demonstrate that Congress has historical 
experience in the discipline of constitutional determination has 
perhaps caused you to forget that I have advanced it here merely 
as a facet of my theme that Congress is the ultimate determinant, 
largely through the purse. 
That, of course, creates problems on the exercise of that power 
of tax and appropriation. The restraints, we have seen, are to be 
largely self-imposed. Many of them will lend themselves to elabora-
tion in the kind of terms ( e.g., "power areas") a court would em-
ploy in expounding constitutional limitations were these cases 
judicially reviewable. They are, however, in my judgment, much 
more likely to involve other factors more akin to the field of polit-
ical science and on which I will have had no skill or training. 
Fortunately for you, I have not, in the figure of the day, had to 
blast off wholly unaided into unknown space. There is a tre-
mendous body of literature.52 
Com mission Searches for Guides 
It was to ascertain these considerations which should impel 
federal governmental action or nonaction which principally occu-
50 Justice Schaefer of the Supreme Court of Illinois, in "Federalism and State Criminal 
Procedure," 70 HAR.v. L. REv. I (1956), discusses federal habeas corpus and some of the 
proposed statutory changes, including those of the federal Judicial Conference. 
51 State Subversion Act: Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956). See the mono-
graph for the Conference of Chief Justices by Professor Crampton, "Supersession and 
Subversion: Limitations on State Power To Deal with Issues of Subversion and Loyalty," 
8 UNIV. Cm. LAw SCHOOL REcoRD 24 (Special Supp. 1958). 
Nebraska Right to Work Act v. Railway Labor Act: Railway Employes' Dept., A.F.L. 
v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956). 
ll2 One of the best surveys is the annotated chronology of significant events, develop• 
ments and publications, INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (RM-321), 
published by the Council of State Governments (1958), by W. Brooke Graves, Senior Spe-
cialist Division, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress. And there is a lifetime 
of reading material listed in the 119-page selected bibliography on INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, Intergovernmental Relations Subcommittee of the House 
Committee on Government Operations [Committee Print] 84th Cong., 2d sess., 1956 
compiled under the direction of W. Brooke Graves. 
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pied the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. Earlier I 
referred to the congressional declaration that the purpose of this 
study was so "these relations [between state and federal govern-
ment] may be clearly defined and the functions concerned may be 
allocated to their proper jurisdiction." It is no reflection upon this 
distinguished commission53 that this extravagant ambition was 
never realized-at least not in the sense of a clear chart of respec-
tive areas. But its general objective discussion with full oppor-
tunity to register dissents (which are few in number) is worth-
while. And its major conclusions are quite significant. 
Recognizing that the full exertion of the powers of the federal 
government to legislate in matters of national welfare could de-
stroy the vitality of state and local institutions, it emphasized sev-
eral major aspects of the responsibility of the national government 
to preserve and strengthen the federal system.54 Amplifying these 
general considerations, the main burden of the commission's re-
port, together with its recommendations in specific areas, 55 is this. 
The subject matter must concern the national welfare56 before the 
problem even arises whether it is fit for national action. But hav-
ing decided that, vital questions still remain. Obviously there is a 
national interest in almost everything which conscientious gov-
ernments at all levels undertake to provide. But is that national 
interest to be best served by national or state or local action? 
What 1vill happen, for instance, to the influence and vitality of 
local government if the federal government takes it over? Is it 
an interest which should be left to the states and local subdivisions 
alone? Or is it one requiring joint action?57 Once it is determined 
53 It was made up of six state governors or former governors, several congressmen and 
senators, representatives of major federal executive departments, outstanding public citizens 
and political scientists. 
54 Significant conclusions of this aspect were "(1) The Constitution sets only maximum 
limits to National action .••• The National Government need not do everything that it 
can do ..•• (2) Where National action is desirable, greater attention should be given to 
minimizing its extent and to leaving room for and facilitating cooperative or independent 
State action. • . . (3) The organization of the National Government does not at present 
afford adequate recognition of the national interest in State and local government .•.. " 
Report of the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, c. 3, p. 60 et seq. (1955). 
55 Agriculture, civil aviation, civil defense, education, employment security, highways, 
housing and urban renewal, national disaster relief, natural resources and conservation, 
public health, vocational rehabilitation and welfare. 
56 Justice Schaefer of the Supreme Court of Illinois, in "Federalism and State Criminal 
Procedures," 70 HARv. L. REv. 1 at 26 (1956), in quite a different context, suggests a likeli-
hood of a national interest from the impact of state criminal cases on our international 
relations. Civilization, he points out, is not measured merely in retrospect. "It is taken 
from day to day by the peoples of the world, and to them the criminal procedure sanc-
tioned by any of our states is the procedure sanctioned by the United States." 
57 This is illustrated by the limited effectiveness of state regulation of milk resulting 
in the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 upheld in United States v. Rock 
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that some character of national action is needed, many further 
problems arise on its administration. Shall it be by joint action 
such as is found under the Motor Carrier Act and under the 
Employment Security statute? Should it be by sole action of the 
federal government, such as the Old Age Survivors Insurance 
program? 
Running through the congressional analysis of any such pro-
posed action must always be the basic query: what will this na-
tional action do to the essential existence of strong, independent 
local and state governments? 
Dangers of Federal Grants 
As this congressional constitutional line drawing will come 
largely through exercise of the power of the purse, it was natural 
that the commission was vitally concerned with the impact of 
federal subsidies of grants-in-aid. In additions to the Commission 
Report, its studies on this subject comprise two printed volumes.58 
A reading of these studies reveals some interesting things. 
There were, for example, in the early days of the programs in-
stances of irritating experiences in some states with overbearing 
bureaucrats imposing rather artificially rigid controls. But as com-
petent state professional staffs have been developed, these have 
been eliminated by close and cordial collaboration. But in none do 
they feel that the state is being destroyed59 by the receipt of the 
Royal Co-operative, 307 U.S. 533 (1939). SWISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOP· 
MENT, 2d ed., 961 (1954). 
58 Professional management-consulting and research organizations were retained to 
make special on-the-ground studies on the impact of federal grant-in-aid policies in seven 
states, including Michigan. An additional group of twenty-five states was covered in a 
separate study under the guidance of outstanding authorities in the field of government in 
each state. THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL GRANTS-IN-AID ON THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF 
STATE AND LOCAL GoVERNMENTS, a survey report by the Government Affairs Institute sub-
mitted to the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations CTune 1955) and a summary 
of the original survey, THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND FISCAL IMPACT OF FEDERAL GRANTS-IN-AID, 
by the Management Consulting and Research Organizations CTune 1955). 
59 The underlying assumption seems to be that whoever receives any form of aid has, 
to that extent, become beholden, with the recipient's independence and integrity being 
undermined. So far as this may be a political-sociological truth, a likely safeguard is the 
recognition of it. Whether this was a timeless warning or a mere prophecy, others will 
have to decide. But in 1857 when Congress donated to the states and territories 67 million 
acres of land for schools and universities, one senator raised the question: "How long will 
it be before they will ask for every object, and come to rely entirely upon the federal 
government even for the expenses of their own, until they have become so dependent on 
the national Treasury that they will have but a shadow of sovereignty left, and be mere 
suppliants at the doors of Congress for anything that the general government may have 
at its disposal?" Similar views were expressed by Senator Ingalls of Kansas in connection 
with the 1887 Hatch Act. SWISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 2d ed., 274, 
384 (1954). 
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grants, or by the assertion of a limited control on the disposition 
of funds. Indeed, in two of the states of the Deep South where 
states' rights is a constant battle cry, there was a recognition that 
specific vital needs had been met which the states never would 
have met. There are some other serious implications. Many 
reported that the grants tend further to undermine the already 
weakened power of the state governor because the programs gen-
erally bypass the state executive to deal directly with the local 
state operational agency. 
State governments may also be weakened by grants going di-
rectly to local subdivisions for airports and the like. But this 
reflects the internal state conflict which pits rural against urban 
to send the city fathers to Washington. 
But in all of these phases, the states have it within their power, 
as some have done, to channel all federal grants to fix responsible 
direction in seeking and administering such grants. 
Most serious, of course, is the indeterminate significance of the 
impact of the distribution of these huge sums (5 billion dollars in 
1958). Incidentally, over 90 percent of this is in the three fields 
of highway construction, public health, and welfare (federal sub-
sidy to state old-age pension programs). The amount is indeed 
large and the recipients become vocal and effective pressure 
groups within the states. But the economic importance of the 
grants is distorted. For the grants are small, indeed, in contrast 
to the large local expenditures by the federal government for 
national defense, postal service, rivers and harbors, interstate com-
merce, and the like.60 But the impact may be much more than 
economic. What are grants actually doing to state and local gov-
Indiana acted collectively by its 1947 Resolution against federal handouts, guardians, 
the magic of federal money and which ended with the ringing declaration: "We are fed 
up with subsidies, doles and paternalism. We are no one's stepchild. We have grown up. 
We serve notice that we will resist Washington, D.C. adopting us. Resolved: ' ... ·we 
want government to come home.' " ANDERSON, THE NATION AND TIIE STATES, RlvALS OR 
PARTNERS? 6 (1955). At the last word Indiana still exists and in 1956 received from the 
federal government $50,523,000. STATISTICAL ABSTRAcr, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. 
OF COMMERCE, Table 515 at p. 416 (1958). 
Besides the impact studies of the Commission, this serious problem has been the 
subject of much other comment. See Furman, "The Impact of Federal Subsidies on State 
Functions," 43 A.B.A.J. 1101 (1957), the prize-winning essay in the 1957 Ross Essay Con• 
test, American Bar Association; Richardson, "The Impact of Federal Subsidies on State 
Functions," 47 KY. L.J. 47 (1958). 
60 Using at random a few of the states whose federal grants comprise an above the 
national average percentage of total tax revenues, the following reflects the relative finan-
cial importance to the state economy of federal grant payments in comparison to federal 
civilian payrolls on the national average of $4,690 annual wage. 
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ernments? Well, using tax revenue and comparative rolls of ci-
vilian employees as a measure of governmental activity, the death 
or creeping demise of state (and local) government is, in the 
famous words of Mark Twain, grossly exaggerated.61 Seriously, 
Numberof Fed. Approx.% 
Fed. Civ. Gross Grants of Grants 
State Employees Fed. to to State 
1957 Payroll State Tax Revenue 
(a} (b) (c) (c) 
Alabama ----- 53,479 $250 mil. $80 mil. 22% 
Mississippi ----- 17,300 81 mil. 51 mil. 32% 
Arkansas ------ 14,531 68 mil. 44 mil. 25% 
Georgia ------ 54,623 256 mil. 79 mil. 20% 
On a national average the percentage of federal civilian employees is approximately 45% 
defense, 23% postal, 8% V .A., 24% others. 
In addition to direct payrolls there will be large sums spent locally for materials, 
supplies, transportation, etc.; e.g., the $39 billion military defense budget includes military 
industrial installations such as Oak Ridge, Tennessee; Redstone Arsenal, Alabama; Cape 
Canaveral, Florida. Expenditures, either direct or through governmental contractors, for 
1957 totaled $19 billion for work to be done within the United States. STATISTICAL .ABSTR.Acr, 
BUREAU OF THE CENsus, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, Table 302, p. 243 (1958). 
(a) Table 493, P· 397, STATISTICAL .ABSTR.Acr (1958) 
(b) Table 494, p. 398, STATISTICAL ABSTRAcr (1958) 
(c) Table 515, p. 416, STATISTICAL .ABSTR.Acr (1958) 
61 The relative civilian employment in 1958 was: 
Federal 
Dept. Defense _____ _ 
Postal 
V.A. ----------
Others ---------
1,058,326 
539,927 
174,675 
539,414 
State 
Local---------
1,358,000t 
4,249,000t 
Total ------- • 2,333,942 ••• 5,608,000 
Annual federal payroll was .. $919,000,000 and for state-local governments - $1,615,000,000. 
• Table 493, p. 397, STATISTICAL ABSTRAcr (1958) 
.. Table 520, p. 423, STATISTICAL ABSTRAcr (1958) 
••• Table 522, p. 424, STATISTICAL ABSTRAcr (1958) 
While the state roster equals the federal non-defense roll, as Anderson points out, the 
number of employees of local units exceed four times that of federal non-defense; and 
state and local combined are five times greater than federal non-defense. ANDERSON, THE 
NATION AND THE STATES, RlvALS OR PARTNERS? 19 (1955). 
The rate of increase in state-local is also greater. State-local units jumped from 4.2 
million in 1951 to 5.6 million in 1957 with payrolls increasing from $1 billion in 1951 to 
$1.6 billion in 1957. In contrast federal employment decreased from 2.5 million to 2.4 
million while payrolls increased slightly from $793 million to $919 million. Table 520, p. 
423, STATISTICAL ABSTRAcr (1958). 
The increase in tax revenues has been as rapid in state and local governments as in 
the national government increasing from $8.5 billion in 1942 to $26.3 billion in 1956. This 
contrasts with federal revenues of $12.2 billion and $65.2 billion out of which allowance 
must be made for a $40 billion peacetime military budget in the federal government. Table 
501, p. 405, STATISTICAL ABSTRAcr (1958). 
Based upon revenue (tax collections, federal grants-in-aid, income from utility and 
liquor store operations, and payments into trust funds for employee retirement, unemploy-
ment compensation), there has been a like increase in state and local governments from $5 
billion in 1922 to $13 billion in 1942 and the staggering total of $41 billion in 1956; there 
has been a like increase in direct expenditures of $5 billion, $10 billion and $43 billion, 
respectively. Table 512, p. 412; Table 500, p. 404, STATISTICAL ABSTRAcr (1958). 
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the complaint today is not of too little local-state government. The 
protest is against too much local, too much state, too much federal, 
and now too much international. 
But no study can ever prove or disprove their subtle influence 
on traditional local responsibility. No doubt grants create habits 
of thought and action. Local problems are too often "solved" in 
Washington. 
Congressional Power To Destroy 
Now we move to a mighty climax. For this discussion demon-
strates that as Congress has its last say, it has the capacity to destroy 
our federal system. It must be conscious, then-step by step-day 
by day-that the proposed national action-standing alone or with 
other programs-may destroy, or weaken, or undermine, or sap 
the energy of the states.62 
Now my beginning takes on relevance. For you can see that 
creeping in again are these analogies from the study of theology. 
For like the dogma of Free Will which recognizes that man as a 
moral agent can claim no virtue for a life of good unless he has 
had the capacity for wrong and has overcome it, Congress is now 
placed in the position of being controlled by its own self-imposed 
discipline. No longer can it legislate in the knowledge that if what 
it does exceeds the powers of the national government, it will be 
held unconstitutional by the Court.63 Now Congress must indeed 
impose upon itself the same self-restraint which it and its members 
have often urged upon the Judiciary. 
Bulwarks for Congress 
What does this conclusion do to this assembly? If constitutional 
federalism is ultimately in the hands of Congress, is there a need 
62 George C. S. Benson, Director of Research, Commission on Intergovernmental Re-
lations, in THE NEW CENTRALIZATION: A STUDY OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONSHIPS IN 
THE UNITED STATES 79 (1941), puts the problem through the question: what is the aim of 
the proposed grant-in-aid? Is it to furnish money so that the states can adopt the policy, 
correct a state policy or effectuate a federal policy? In answer, he warns, "But the 'correc-
tion' of a state policy amounts in practical fact to a substitution - at least in a limited 
field-of_fed_eral polf,cy. It is one step on the road to political-even if not administrative 
- centralization .•.. 
63 Nor can it succumb to the importunities of a strong President that Congress should 
"not permit doubts as to constitutionality, however reasonable, to block the suggested leg-
islation." President Roosevelt's message on the proposed Bituminous Coal Conservation 
Act of 1935, SWISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 2d ed., 935 (1954). Actually 
Jefferson's views may be strikingly parallel, for on the constitutionality of the proposed 
National Bank bill, he advised President Washington that "if the pro and the con hang 
so even as to balance his judgment, a just respect for the wisdom of the legislature would 
naturally decide the balance in favor of their opinion." Id. at 73. 
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for law schools? And will there be any frontier for either law or 
the teaching of it? 
Perhaps what we are really trying to say is: does Congress stand 
alone and unarmed? 
We know, first, that it is not unarmed. It is equipped with 
much experience responsibly exercised. There are many other 
tools which it must develop and many forces which, because of this 
shift, must now be developed acutely. It will require that the 
members of Congress be trained not alone in legislative skills but, 
more important, in all those academic fields of history, philosophy, 
political science, law, and government which sustain in each gen-
eration a living conviction of the indispensable importance of the 
states and the necessity of preserving this system which has served 
so well. There will be an even greater need for articulate, effec-
tive and energetic pressure groups. On bar associations, state and 
national, and other organized professional groups must now fall 
much responsibility for relentless continuous education of the 
Congress lest, in effectuating some transitory policy, it undermine 
the strength of the constituent units. Political parties, through 
platforms, candidates and campaigns, must become vital responsive 
mechanisms through which the national is not allowed to swallow 
up the parts. More vital than ever before will also be the respon-
sible use of the presidential veto power. But no longer can the 
Congress check it to the President who checks it to the Court. 
Now each must sing with the spiritualist, "I've Got the Whole 
Constitution in my Hand." 
One important aid to Congress, too often obscured and never 
overestimated, is non-federal. I speak here of the states, of state 
and local government. The best way to prevent federal encroach-
ments is to satisfy the responsible demands of society by the local, 
state government. How true has history made the celebrated 1906 
prophecy of Elihu Root!64 And for the states effectively to meet 
these demands, there is need for the internal strengthening of the 
machinery and administration of state governments. For each 
state to judge, this may include basic constitutional revisions to 
64 "The intervention of the National Government in many of the matters which it 
has recently undertaken would have been wholly unnecessary if the States themselves had 
been alive to their duty toward the general body of the country. It is useless for the 
advocates of state rights to inveigh against the supremacy of the constitutional laws of 
the United States or against the extension of National authority in the field of necessary 
control where the States themselves fail in the performance of their duty." Address by 
Elihu Root, delivered December 12, 1906, to the Pennsylvania Society in New York. 
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assure responsible direction and control and eliminate artificial 
restraints, and reapportionment to eliminate the urban-rural con-
flict now so common.65 
And finally-and to most of us thankfully-for a vital aid Con-
gress will have the Supreme Court. The Court will have to be 
there to draw the line where Congress, having the power to do it, 
declines to do so. The Court must be there as an indispensable 
instrument to interpret federal legislation and, where appropriate, 
state enactments or local action to determine whether Congress 
has claimed all or relinquished part of a field within its com-
petence. It will still have to be there to assay the validity of state 
legislation attacked under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court 
must be there to vindicate substantive and procedural guarantees 
of the Fourteenth Amendment in state criminal cases and in the 
many facets of the critical race relations problem. And finally 
the Court must be there in the all important areas of fundamental 
constitutional rights of the citizen, such as freedom of thought, 
when they are threatened by actions of a federal or state agency. 
This will reveal the Court in one of its greatest roles. Its 
opinions are for more than the mere decision of a case. They are 
to expound the great truths of our freedom and life under the rule 
of law. They are to serve as fresh lessons of our heritage. And in 
the delicate relationship between the nation and the states Con-
gress will, and should, be greatly influenced by the elaboration of 
these complex factors.66 The Court by what it says in the limited 
cases properly before it will have influence in those now left ulti-
mately to Congress. The Court, no longer the decider, becomes 
instead the teacher. 
65 See Report of the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1955) at 36, "The 
Role of the States"; Blough, "Fiscal Aspects of Federalism," in MAcMAHoN, FEDERALISM 
MATURE AND EMERGENT 384-396 (1955); BENSON, THE NEW CENTRALIZATION: A STUDY OF 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONSHIPS IN THE UNITED STATES 86-116 (1941). 
John Pryor Furman in the Ross Essay article, "The Impact of Federal Subsidies on 
State Functions," 43 A.B.A.J. 1101 at 1146 (1957) reports similar conclusions by the Eighth 
American Assembly, October 1955, on the theme "The Forty-Eight States: Their Tasks as 
Policy Makers and Administrators." 
66 See Anthony Lewis, of the Washington Bureau of the New York Times, "A News-
paperman's View: The Role of the Supreme Court," 45 A.B.A.J. 911 (1959); Rostow, "The 
Court and Its Critics,'' 4 So. TEX. L.J. 160 at 161-164 (1959); and of the decisional-opinion 
process, Justice Schaefer writes: "What is involved, however, is not just the enforcement 
of defined standards. It is also the creative process of writing specific content into the 
highest of our ideals." Schaefer, "Federalism and State Criminal Procedures," 70 HARv. 
L. REv. I at 25 (1956). 
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Beyond the Veil 
What does the future hold? What is there in this frontier of 
the great beyond? Well, it holds this much: we are apprehensive 
about the very existence of our world, our civilization, our free-
dom. These fears arise from the outside forces of the world. We 
are apprehensive, though, that resisting these, we may lose what 
has been our vital force. 
Never in a period of American history has there been such a 
necessity for protection of that constitutional federalism by the 
Congress, by the Executive and by the Judiciary. Each now having 
a vital role to play in its protection-and none any longer able to 
count solely on the other-there must come an awareness of its daily 
importance. Protection of constitutional federalism will become an 
affirmation and not, as so often in the past, a negative prohibition. 
If it is done, we shall continue strong as a nation of independent-
yes, independent and sovereign states. 
To have all committed-to require that all be committed-
to the preservation of this unique structure assures to me that it 
will live. Despite the pessimism of the day that our government 
and way of life is done, I am willing to say with Franklin, "Now at 
length I have the happiness to know that it is a rising and not a 
setting sun."67 
67WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTlTUTION 717 (1947). 
